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Homelessness An Overview
Jim Tull
The homelessness crisis in the United States has reached epidemic proportions as the
diversity of the homeless population expands to the point where it resembles the general
population. The deepest and most long-standing cause ofhomelessness is poverty, but
there are otherforces as well, including the severe shortage of affordable housing (partic-
ularly due to urban renewal); deep funding cuts at the federal, state, and local level; the
policy ofdeinstitutionalization; the Vietnam war; and unemployment. A new public
policy approach to homelessness is needed, one which addresses these multiple forces
and is grounded in the assumptions that housing and a decent standard of living are
rights and entitlements. There are several elements to this fresh approach which, taken
together, require a fundamental mobilization ofpolitical will.
It has been said that a frog immersed in a beaker of boiling water saves itself by
immediately jumping from the beaker, but left in cold water that is gradually
warmed, the same frog adjusts to the changing temperature until it boils to death.
Our country, like the frog who learns to tolerate an intolerable predicament to the
point of its own demise, is ignoring the ballooning crisis of homelessness— and the
poverty that underlies it— at its own peril. Incredibly, some of our cities have come
to resemble what we commonly think of as the Third World. Many of the streets of
New York City, for example, can be compared to those of Calcutta, India.
In some areas the plight of our cities— and their homeless— is even deeper than
some of the poorest places overseas. Commenting on the warehousing of homeless
families in the welfare hotels of New York, Jonathan Kozol writes, "Although I have
spent a great deal of time in recent years in some of the most desolate, diseased and
isolated areas of Haiti, I find the Martinique Hotel the saddest place that I have
been in my entire life." 1
Much of this sadness, I think, lies in the spiritual poverty and demoralization
that plagues many of the homeless in our country, where most people are relatively
well off and place a premium on individualism and economic standing, and where
the resources needed to solve the problem are so accessible. Too often at the
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Amos House men's shelter, in Providence, Rhode Island, I have witnessed the
evaporation of a man's dignity and sometimes even his sanity while he searches for
another job, having become homeless. Our temporary hospitality tries to shore up a
person's sense of self-worth, but the homeless face too many obstacles to their own
survival. There is more to having a home, particularly the support it provides, than
those of us who have them are able to appreciate. "Even phone-booth vacancies
are scarce in New York City. As in public housing, people are sometimes obliged to
double-up. One night I stood for an hour and observed three people— man,
woman and child— jammed into a single booth. All three were asleep."2
Homelessness is first of all a horrifying experience for anyone to suffer; second, it
is an acutely intolerable social condition, like the frog's boiling water, that the rest of
us have for some reason permitted to grow and grow.
Counting the Homeless
The homeless have been studied by many researchers, and the nature and scope of
the problem has been carefully documented. Nevertheless, the single unanswered
question is, How many homeless are there in the United States? No one knows. The
shelter population is easily counted, but the only effort to count all the homeless
nationwide was that carried out by the Census Bureau in 1990. The census count of
homeless people on the street, however, was so low and the counting method so
ineffective that the bureau was forced to disavow its tally as a useful count of the
population. 3 The count was 230,000 people. But as early as 1983, the Department
of Health and Human Services estimated 2 million homeless.
Aside from the total number of homeless, however, the fact that the homeless
population continues to increase in many of our nation's major cities at an annual
rate of 25 percent is cause for alarm.4 With no relief in sight, even a conservative
count of the current population will snowball year to year at this rate. Equally sober-
ing for many who cling to stereotypes is the staggering number of homeless families
in our country. One third of our cities' homeless are families with children.5 In
Rhode Island, nearly one in four people seeking shelter are children under twelve. 6
This trend is distressing not only because of the harm caused by homelessness to
these children, but also because any war on crime and drugs will be beside the point
as long as hundreds of thousands of children in our country are growing up with
no home.
Neither is homelessness an exclusively urban phenomenon. Recent attention has
been drawn to the increasing number of homeless people, mostly families, in rural
America. One survey estimates that 20,000 people are homeless in Ohio's rural
areas alone.7
Another stumbling block to achieving a thorough count of the homeless, and
one reason why public response to the crisis remains so weak, is that most homeless
people are "hidden." The Census Bureau might count only shelter and street resi-
dents as homeless, but many people are inclined to seek out friends and family when
they lose their housing rather than go to a shelter. Unless an indefinite welcome is
extended by the hosting friend or family, this doubling-up arrangement is precari-
ous. Many others live in cars and abandoned buildings, and still other homeless
people are holed up temporarily in detox wards or prisons, driven there sometimes
by homelessness itself and unemployment. I consider people in any of these circum-
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stances homeless. They are hidden and uncounted, but their plight adds substan-
tially to the national tragedy, which otherwise amounts for some of those more for-
tunate to little more than the inconvenience of having to sidestep a sleeping body on
their way to work.
Finally, any account of the homeless problem must include mention of those who
live on the brink of homelessness. They cannot be counted as homeless but many
will become homeless. Of this group, the most identifiably vulnerable are those who
face the threat of homelessness simply because they cannot afford their current
housing. Basing affordability on the 30 percent of income standard used in federal
housing programs, one study found that the cost of renting a one-bedroom apart-
ment (about half of all renter households require an apartment with two or more
bedrooms) was unaffordable by over one third of renter households in every state
and over half of all households in six states, four of which are in New England
(Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont). 8 In Rhode Island, a household
must earn $22,000 to afford a two-bedroom apartment. And while families struggle
to keep their housing, those having to relocate for one reason or another are forced
to pay two or three months' rent up front just to move in. Of those on the edge who
have managed to avoid homelessness, it can be said that they have been impover-
ished by escalating housing costs.
Why So Many Homeless: Clarifying the Issues
While there are certainly competing perspectives on what has brought on the cur-
rent crisis, there is also some confusion surrounding the problem. The first popular
perspective considers the homeless themselves to be the source of the problem.
Alcohol and drug abuse, financial irresponsibility, mental illness, divorce, and
reproductive habits are among the personal behaviors causing homelessness,
according to this view. The more conservative version of this view looks at the
problem as a public nuisance to those who aren't homeless and offers solutions that
clear the homeless from view and harm. It is generally a response that relies on
courts, prisons, and mental institutions and is based on the premise that the home-
less are to blame for their predicament and do not deserve a sympathetic response.
The more liberal version, while recognizing that some groups and individuals are
disadvantaged from the outset, also identifies the homeless themselves as the
source of the problem, but offers a more compassionate response that calls for
giving personal assistance to homeless families and individuals. The homeless
aren't as blameworthy, yet this version does not seriously fault the social structures
of their wider communities.
A second perspective attributes the homeless problem to our country's social
structures and the values and priorities that sustain them and looks to solutions
that include shifting government priorities in the short term and creating funda-
mental, long-term changes in our political and economic structures. This article
focuses on the political causes of, and solutions to, homelessness that reflect this
broader perspective.
There is, of course, a real sense in which the truth lies somewhere between these
two perspectives. An individual homeless person, for example, might have lost his
housing because the rent was too high due to the shortage of low-cost housing and
because he spent too much money on alcohol. Those who interpret the problem
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solely in terms of personal deficiencies fail to recognize the interplay between the
social and personal causes of homelessness. An analogy might be drawn to musical
chairs to help expose the error. The second perspective attributes the rise in home-
lessness during the 1980s primarily to the severe shortage of affordable housing, a
product by and large of social policy. There are not enough housing units for every-
one. Like musical chairs, a game with eleven contestants competing for ten chairs
and a loser who is either slow or unlucky, the housing crisis has meant that some are
left on the street. They are left out because they are less desirable tenants, for what-
ever reasons, than others on the waiting list, or because of bad luck. The first per-
spective does not address the homeless crisis as a whole, but only the question of
why some people are homeless and not others. If a city intersection is missing stop
signs, some drivers are destined to collide. We can conclude that a particular driver
was intoxicated or not paying attention, or we can put up stop signs and attend to
people's driving habits as a largely separate issue.
The Right to Housing
In choosing, as I do, to approach homelessness as a social or political rather than a
personal problem, and in making a distinction between perspectives one and two, I
assume that the state is obligated to ensure that the basic housing needs of its resi-
dents are met. Many perspective one advocates deny that the community is obli-
gated to house its residents, or even its "citizens." While these advocates might
concede the musical chairs mistake, they quickly argue that the supply of housing
is legitimately a function of free market forces, not government policy. This was
Ronald Reagan's position and policy (although he had no problem with the states
taking compensatory action in the face of his massive cuts in federal housing aid).
With the Housing Act of 1949, Washington announced its goal of providing ade-
quate housing for all American families, but significantly stopped short of declaring
that housing is a right and entitlement.
Regarding the question of the right to housing in the context of today's homeless
epidemic, there are at least three different positions that can support the view that
the problem is primarily one of public responsibility and policy: (1) housing is a nat-
ural or human right; (2) housing is not a natural right but should be a legal right
because living without housing or without adequate housing is unpleasant for those
who have to endure it and has negative repercussions for everyone else; (3) housing
is not and should not be a right of any kind and is not a government responsibility,
but since the government got into the housing business decades ago and gradually
invested up to $32 billion annually in housing as of 1980, any dramatic downshifting
in this growing commitment will cause intolerable dislocation, including widespread
poverty and homelessness.
I believe that a community is obligated to provide all residents decent, safe, and
affordable housing that is based on current standards and available resources in the
community. In the United States today, certain minimal standards of decency are
widely accepted, so that, for example, living in a multifamily house is considered
adequate and living with rats is not. Undeniably, this nation is capable of ensuring
that all its people have housing that measures up to accepted standards. In short,
housing is a basic human right, given the housing capacity and relative styles and
standards accepted within a community.
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Homelessness did not become a cause of widespread concern until the mid-
1980s, yet a number of elements contributed to the current crisis that predated the
Reagan/Bush period. They are all tied to public policy decisions made at the state,
local, and national levels of government. Three of these contributing forces are
noteworthy: deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill; urban renewal; and the Viet-
nam War. These developments, coupled with the housing crisis of the 1980s, inter-
connect with and overlap one another.
The Mentally 111 Homeless
Deinstitutionalization became a public policy trend in many states during the
1960s. The policy aim was to reduce dramatically the number of patients cared for
in mental health institutions, transferring care for them to community mental
health centers (CMHCs), where they could be served on an outpatient basis. The
policy evolved in response to, among other things, reports of inhumane conditions
within existing institutions, the introduction of psychotropic medication capable
of regulating behavior outside the hospital, a social and legal trend toward main-
streaming mental health patients and protecting their right to refuse treatment,
and the opportunity for states to shift financial responsibility for the mentally ill
to the federal government (through new programs such as Supplemental Security
Income and Medicaid).
The policy achieved its first objective: in the thirty years since 1955, the number
of patients in public mental institutions was reduced nationwide by a startling 79
percent (see Figure l). 9 The second goal, which was to provide sufficient care for
discharged patients, failed miserably and helped produce an onslaught of homeless
people with severe mental illness. Even after this policy's failure was clearly demon-
strated, state institutions continued to empty their beds and close down so that the
state's financial burden for patients could be shifted to the federal government. 10
Among the nation's homeless, roughly 30 percent suffer from severe mental ill-
ness.
11 The ongoing policy of deinstitutionalization has been a major cause of this
tragedy. Although CMHCs were funded to provide the care that was no longer
given in hospitals, many of the promised centers never materialized and the care
given by those that did proved inadequate. Some of the reasons are the following.
1. The lack of coordination and cooperation between the hospitals discharging
patients and the CMHCs expected to care for those discharged.
2. The tendency of many CMHCs to shift their marketing focus from the severe
mentally ill to white middle-class patients with personal problems who could pay for
counseling (in many places, including Providence, the centers actually changed their
name and location to attract the new clientele— see Figure 2).
3. The inability of many patients to conform to outpatient treatment schedules
and other demands along with the inadequacy of medication to substitute for resi-
dential care.
4. The lure of private practice, which drained too many psychiatrists and other
mental health professionals away from treating the poor and severely ill, despite the
federal subsidies most professionals received to provide such treatment in complet-
ing their training.
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Figure 1
Number of Inpatients in Public Mental Hospitals
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Source: Fuller Torrey, Nowhere to Go (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 219-20.
1980 1985
In the massive shuffle of people from hospitals to the CMHCs, many people
fell through the enormous cracks created by deinstitutionalization. They became
completely lost in the mental health care system and often ended up in prison
or on the street.
Urban Renewal
Although deinstitutionalization has been a common target of blame for the home-
less crisis, other forces contributed to this process before the Reagan-Bush years.
One was the conversion of low-cost housing units to some other purpose, beginning
in the 1970s and accelerating again in the late 1980s.
Urban renewal (or redevelopment) and highway projects often meant the large-
scale destruction of low-income housing units. To make their cities more attractive,
state and local officials often applied legal means and invested public funds to
replace tenements with upscale apartments, civic and convention centers, office
buildings, and roads. Roughly half a million low-rent housing units were lost in the
process during the 1970s. 12 Single-room-occupancy units (SROs) were hardest hit
because their image contrasted most sharply with the upscale designs of city plan-
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Figure 2
Percent of Admissions to Community Mental Health
Centers with Diagnosis of Social Maladjustment and
No Mental Disorder versus Schizophrenia, 1970-1978
1970 1976 1977 19781971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Admissions diagnosed with social
maladjustment and no mental disorder
Admissions diagnosed with schizophrenia
Source: Fuller Torrey, Nowhere to Go (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 219-20.
ners. Between 1970 and 1982, approximately 1,116,000 SRO units, nearly half the
total supply, were lost.
Many mental health patients discharged from hospitals from the early 1960s on
were able to find this kind of housing if they could not live with their families. The
availability of SROs saved deinstitutionalization from its meanest effect: massive
homelessness. Although many patients did become homeless during the early years
of deinstitutionalization, and many who survived in SROs did not receive adequate
treatment, the crisis of the homeless mentally ill that we experience today is the by-
product of deinstitutionalization and a housing shortage. Put another way, urban
renewal squeezed many onto the streets.
Behind the redevelopment steamroller came the dislocating effects of gentrifica-
tion and speculation. The former involved the conversion of neighborhoods from
low-income to middle- and upper-income households; the latter was the practice of
buying and selling property simply to profit from rapidly changing market condi-
tions. Often the two forces act together. For example, an investor might cash in on
recent public renewal investments in an area, purchase low-cost property, renovate
it for the new, higher income residents moving to the renewing neighborhood, and
earn higher rents or sell at a profit. The result was displaced low-income persons
and inflated housing costs.
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The Vietnam War
Deinstitutionalization, together with the disappearance of SROs, left many peo-
ple homeless who did not have the personal resources to live independently or to
compete for available housing. Compounding this was the war in Vietnam. While
mental institutions were discharging patients in droves, the war produced an inordi-
nately high number of returning veterans scarred with psychological and substance-
abuse afflictions.
Veterans represent a disproportionately high percentage of the homeless popula-
tion, with estimates ranging from 23 to 33 percent. At least 10 percent of the home-
less are Vietnam era vets. The unwillingness of the government to effectively meet
the mental health and substance-abuse needs of returning veterans is the tragic
result of public policy decisions. The fact that so many Vietnam veterans remain
homeless is, in part, the result of the damaging and lingering effects of war and the
failure of existing veteran support services to adequately meet these veterans' very
serious needs.
The "New" Homeless: Changing Demographics
in the 1980s
During the post-World War II years of economic expansion and rising affluence,
Americans came to associate homelessness with the relatively few number of skid
row alcoholics who roamed the streets in certain neighborhoods of large cities. Typi-
cally, they were older men, and aside from vagrancy ordinances and the like there
was little public policy response to their plight. These people did not attract much
public sympathy.
By the late seventies and into the eighties, however, whole new categories of
people became homeless until the homeless population as a whole began to resem-
ble the population of the nation, which is where we are today. In the late seventies
and early eighties, young men who were not directly affected by deinstitutionaliza-
tion or the war were the next category of homeless to be added to the swelling ranks.
These new homeless— a disproportionate number of whom were African-American
and Hispanic— fell into the streets because of unemployment. As with the other
homeless, these unemployed men could not compete for the dwindling supply of
affordable housing. Single women were also beginning to appear at shelters at an
increasing rate, particularly as victims of domestic violence.
But homelessness did not attract widespread public concern until the mid-1980s,
when the numbers began to increase dramatically, with women and children and
families constituting the latest categories. By 1986, according to a survey conducted
by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 28 percent of the homeless in twenty-eight of
our nation's largest cities were families with children and 15 percent were single
women. 13 By the end of 1990, families with children comprised half of all those seek-
ing shelter in Rhode Island; 27 percent of homeless Rhode Islanders were children
under eighteen. 14 In addition to unemployment and the absence of mental health
services, the Conference of Mayors report cited the scarcity of affordable housing
for low-income people as the most frequently identified cause of homelessness.
There is a consensus among homeless advocates that this crisis of affordable hous-
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ing, which began in the 1970s and rapidly accelerated in the 1980s, is the most
responsible cause for today's homeless epidemic.
The Impact of Reaganomics
It is one thing to lose one's job, income, and then housing, and quite another to find
oneself homeless simply because one's housing has become unaffordable and other
available housing is also out of reach. This predicament doesn't require a loss of job
or even a change of income, but merely a change in landlord or a short-term finan-
cial crisis, such as theft. This is one reason why many women with children have
joined the bulging homeless population. Public financial support for poor families
(AFDC and other assistance) was previously enough at least to maintain a resi-
dence. Now, any family living under the poverty line is vulnerable to homelessness.
This is the first time since the Great Depression that this condition has plagued our
country. In other words, to be poor is reason enough to be homeless.
If a severe shortage of affordable housing is the current primary cause of home-
lessness, the Reagan/Bush administration's housing policies were responsible for
creating this shortage. But other administration policies, particularly with respect to
taxation, which directly and indirectly produced a substantial transfer of wealth from
the poor to the rich, thus leading to greater poverty and a weakened ability to main-
tain rent payments, also meant homelessness for many families and individuals.
Family income decreased while housing costs increased.
Public housing, as we know it today, first appeared as part of the U.S. Housing
Act of 1937 in response to the Depression. The federal government's commitment
to public housing was significantly strengthened by the Housing Act of 1949, when
the number of households in the postwar years was dramatically increasing. This act
established the goal of creating "a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family." Since then, Washington has steadily allocated resources
to meet this goal, creating subsidized housing for low-income people up to the cur-
rent level of about 5 million units. Public housing has been a steadily growing (aside
from a slowdown during the Nixon administration), bipartisan commitment, on
which the country as a whole and poor people in particular have come to rely.
But in 1980, the federal government led by Ronald Reagan abandoned hous-
ing as a responsibility. From 1981 to 1989, government support for low-income hous-
ing was slashed from $32 billion per year to $7.5 billion, a drop of 80 percent in real
dollars (see Figure 3). That this is more of an abandonment than simply a
decrease is reflected in the cancerous HUD scandals that drained billions from
what little remained in the department's housing budget. Nobody seemed to care.
In the words of one senior HUD official in 1985, "We're getting out of the housing
business, period." 15
During the 1970s, as the urban renewal steamroller eliminated low-cost, private,
nonsubsidized housing, the federal government stepped up its housing initiative to
compensate for this loss. But into the 1980s, this public assistance was cut off, and
the availability of low-income housing began to drop off dramatically (Figure 3). By
1980, about 170,000 new subsidized units were being produced annually; by 1990,
the number had fallen to 25,000 a year. The private sector continued to serve the
better-off in the population; for example, less than 8 percent of all new private mul-
tifamily housing produced in 1986 rented for less than $300 a month. These trends
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Figure 3
HUD's Assisted Housing Budget Authority
(1980-1990)
Billions
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
Source: National Low Income Housing Coalition, Information Bulletin, 1990.
1990
resulted in a severe net loss of low-income housing. By the late 1980s, over half a
million low-rent units were being lost annually. About 2.5 million people were being
displaced from their housing every year. 16
The dwindling supply of low-cost housing due to the sudden withdrawal of fed-
eral resources, combined with a serious, recessionary slowdown in private construc-
tion in the early 1980s, not only displaced poor people onto the street, but further
impoverished those who still had housing. Low-income people have been forced to
pay an increasingly higher portion of their income on housing as they compete for
apartments. The decrease in available housing units translated into skyrocketing
rents. By the mid-1980s, nearly one half of all low-income households were devoting
over 70 percent of their income to housing (see Figures 4 and 5). In Rhode Island,
for example, I know many individuals who hand over their entire General Public
Assistance check to their landlords every week. During the past decade, average
rents in Rhode Island increased by 153 percent and home prices by 165 percent,
while household incomes grew by only 93 percent. One estimate places the number
of overcrowded households in Rhode Island at more than 4,000, another sad reflec-
tion of the housing crisis. 17
The effects of the recession on the private housing industry also were felt by
most middle-income households through increasing housing costs. Rents were
going up and rising home purchase prices were making homeownership out of
reach for many who would ordinarily have become homeowners. This further bur-
dened low-income people as the cycle of gentrification, speculation, and displace-
ment took its toll on poor neighborhoods, particularly in the Northeast during the
late 1980s. Many middle-class Boston-area residents, for example, were looking to
rent or purchase housing in the Providence area to escape prohibitive Boston
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Figure 4
Percent of Income Spent on Housing
by Poor Renters (1985)
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Source: National Low Income Housing Information Service, Information Bulletin, 1990.
housing costs. The result was heightened competition for housing, higher housing
costs, and further displacement.
During 1987 and 1988, a frenzy of speculation wreaked havoc on the low-income
housing market. Investors were selling off property, with various degrees of added
improvement, at enormous profit. Many of the properties affected were converted
to condominiums or high-cost rentals. Clearly the effect of speculation itself on the
cost of housing, and not the housing shortage by itself, increases the rent burden of
poor people and leads to displacement and homelessness.
The Poor Get Poorer
In addition to, and in some ways independent of, the housing shortage and increas-
ing rent burden on the poor, more individuals fell into poverty during the past
decade, and those already impoverished suffered further decline. Even as private
housing construction picked up in the late 1980s, little of it was affordable for those
most in need. By 1990, there was actually a glut in high-priced housing in some
regions. Thus there persists a painful gap between the cost of available housing and
the ability of many in desperate need of housing to pay for it.
Today, 32 million people are living below the poverty line in the United States
compared with 25 million in 1981. Of these, 12.6 million are children, representing
about one child out of five. This represents a 2.2 million increase in child poverty
since 1980. 18 Significantly, this substantial increase in poverty occurred alongside
continuous economic growth between 1982 and 1989. Not everyone suffered a
decline in spending money. While the poor were worse off at the end of the decade,
the wealthy enjoyed a windfall (Figure 6).
Two primary factors contributing to the increase in poverty were the recession of
the early 1980s, together with changing employment requirements, and a govern-
ment policy that consistently favored the well-off at the expense of the poor. For
many, the recession came and then gave way to good times, but many others never
recovered. One reason is that the recession dealt another strong blow to the coun-
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Figure 5
Median Percent of Income Spent on Housing
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Source: Roundup, newsletter of the Low Income Housing Information Service, no. 146, December
1991-January 1992.
try's competitive position in manufacturing industries and the economy shifted more
into high-tech and service industries, displacing workers and increasing demand for
skills they didn't have. Between 1981 and 1986, approximately 2.2 million workers
each year were dislocated from their jobs, according to the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics.
19 The demand for production line work and unskilled labor never rebounded
after the recession. Many workers who lost their jobs never found another one or
resorted to minimum-wage employment. Many of these found themselves homeless.
In another public policy blunder, the government not only failed to compensate
for this massive dislocation, it enacted policies that further impoverished the
employed poor and recently unemployed. Between 1980 and 1988, for example,
the real value of the minimum wage dropped by 31 percent. 20 In the same period,
the percentage of hourly wage earners whose income was insufficient to support
a family of three above the poverty line rose by more than 50 percent. 21
As the gap between rich and poor widened, those falling into the poverty camp
came increasingly from the ranks of the employed. By 1990, nearly one in four of the
homeless received income from part- or full-time employment. This new category of
homeless, which included families with children, elicited a response of shock and/or
sympathy from much of the housed public, helping to generate attention to the crisis
in the late 1980s.
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Figure 6
Average Aftertax Income Gains and Losses from
1980-1990, by Various Household Income Groups
Percentage Change
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Source: Congressional Budget Office
Source: National Coalition for the Homeless, Safety Network 9, no. 9 (September 1990).
Ronald Reagan's response to the problem was to deny that there were poor and
homeless people in America and push through a series of measures that resulted in
more poverty and more homeless people. Directly affecting the poor were the gov-
ernment's massive cutbacks in human needs programs such as housing. Federal cash
payments to low-income families with children, for example, dropped by 21 percent
during the decade. 22 With tax, deregulation, and other policy initiatives, the Reagan
administration succeeded in enriching the well-off while pumping billions into the
military. The end result was a massive transfer of resources from the poor to the
affluent and from human services to the Pentagon (Figure 7). When homelessness is
viewed as a consequence either of a housing shortage or a household income short-
age, the cause is clear: it is poverty.
The Twenty-year Solution
Various means have been employed by the federal government over the years
to provide low-cost housing for the poor. One method frequently used is to offer
subsidies to private developers who in exchange agree to rent the housing to
low-income people at a set rate and for a specified time period (for example,
thirty years). As public policy, this approach has proved flawed in many respects
although it has retained its appeal among elected officials. One major weakness is
that it is shortsighted. What happens when the contract expires and the private
owner is permitted to convert the use of subsidized units? Contracts for many such
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Figure 7
Winners and Losers
Federal Spending from 1980-1990
(adjusted for inflation)
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units, built in the late sixties and seventies, are now beginning to expire, opening
the door for conversion and displacement. The number of units that are vulnera-
ble to conversion in the current decade is alarmingly high. As contracts between
developers and the government expire, the former are free to pay any remaining
mortgage debt and change the use of their units; others will default on their loans.
According to a study conducted by the National Low Income Housing Preserva-
tion Commission, without government intervention about 38 percent of all private,
subsidized housing units will be lost by the year 2002 through early payment, 43
percent through default, and 19 percent will not change use. The total number of
lost units will be about 523,000. 23
If this prediction becomes a reality, the effect will be a catastrophe of monumen-
tal proportions. Instead of solving the homeless problem in this decade, yet another
category of people will be added to the already swelling homeless population. There
are two signs of hope indicating that the unwanted effects of expiring contracts will
be mitigated, though they are unlikely to be prevented entirely without radical gov-
ernment intervention. One sign is the current market glut for upscale housing. This,
of course, is but a temporary safety valve, but at least for the moment there is little
incentive in many regions of the country for owners to pay and convert their devel-
opments to condominiums or high-rent apartments. The other sign is that since the
commission's study, Washington has in fact intervened. As an amendment to the
National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, Congress included measures, primarily in
the form of incentives, to reduce the chance that low-income housing units will be
converted to other uses.
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Yes, But Not in My Backyard
Although the current housing crisis stems primarily from federal policy decisions,
state and local governments have also contributed to the problem. They have never
been the major sources of funding for subsidized housing, a role traditionally
assumed by the federal government, but they have often discouraged its develop-
ment and fueled the poverty cycle by such means as exclusionary zoning ordinances
and decisions and by lax enforcement of fair housing regulations. Both of these
forces severely limit where poor people, especially poor minorities, can live and
where low-income housing or residential support programs for homeless people
or those with special needs can be located.
For example, Barrington, Rhode Island, passed an ordinance prohibiting multiple-
unit dwellings (Barrington also outlawed hanging laundry on an outside clothesline!).
The town of Foster requires a minimum of five acres to build a house, with no provi-
sion for cluster housing that is combined with large open space tracts. These regula-
tions essentially exclude low-cost housing and low-income people. Similarly, the
zoning hearing process is used to block low-income housing, shelters, and residential
support programs. In Providence, Travelers Aid was forced to turn back a federal
grant award for a runaway youth residence because the residents of the neighbor-
hood where the program was to be located successfully pressured the zoning board
to deny the needed variance. While there are legitimate reasons to deny access to a
project in many cases, and neighborhoods should have some degree of control, pro-
grams are sometimes rejected on a wholesale basis, leaving them either clustered in
the same (low-income) neighborhoods or without a home at all.
In addition to discouraging needed low-cost housing developments, shelter,
and support programs, these actions perpetuate the ghettoization of poverty. Low-
income housing projects, group homes, residential drug and alcohol programs, and
shelters all wind up in the same neighborhood or in certain designated areas (for
instance, Rhode Island located its emergency homeless shelter in the state's large
prison complex). Ghettoization fuels the cycle of poverty, and the segregation of
rich and poor people encourages the former to neglect the needs of the latter. And
more poverty and neglect mean more homelessness.
Ending the Crisis: Government Responds to Pressure
When the Reagan-Bush team signaled the end of the federal government's role in
meeting housing and other human needs, it expressed a philosophical conviction
concerning the purpose of government. If housing and other human needs are to
be responded to by the public sector at all, the view goes, the job is best left to the
states and municipalities. Moreover, many feared that the administration's budget
slashing would severely strain budgets at the state and local levels, thus leading to
desperate attempts to mend the torn safety net. But these fears proved to be for the
most part unfounded, because at the height of the nation's economic boom in 1988,
many state budgets were posting comfortable surpluses. In fact, Rhode Island tax-
payers were receiving token rebates from their magnanimous state government.
During this period fiscal collapse was averted at the state and local levels not
because the responsibilities relinquished by Washington were easily absorbed at
these levels, but because little effort was made to absorb them. Now, of course, the
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recession and the profligacy of the 1980s are causing enormous fiscal hardship in
many states, including Rhode Island.
The homeless crisis was first recognized and responded to by ordinary citizens and
private organizations. In addition to private programs aimed at getting people off
the street and meeting the more urgent needs of the homeless, national and local
organizations and coalitions gained momentum in pressuring for public intervention
in the crisis. Of necessity perhaps, the demands brought by advocates gradually esca-
lated from treating the conspicuous effects of homelessness to addressing the root
causes. The public sector has slowly and inadequately followed along by responding
to these escalating demands.
In the early 1980s, an acute and obvious need to get people off the street inspired
activists to demand that state and local governments provide emergency shelter ser-
vices to bridge the expansive gap left by the efforts of private groups. Gradually,
public shelters began to appear. In desperation, often under court order, states and
cities took to placing homeless people, particularly families, in private hotels, paying
the going rate— and sometimes much more. The "welfare hotels" in New York City
are probably the best known examples of this policy. The horror stories depicting
conditions in some of these hotels are matched only by the insanity of the public
policy decisions and procedures that created and maintained them.24 Although more
recently the court ordered people moved out of these hotels, New York continues to
pay private hotel owners as much as $2,300 per month to house a homeless family.
The public policy response at the state and local levels— to provide emergency
shelter for the homeless— was mirrored at the federal level. Federal funds for
emergency shelter became available in 1983 through the Emergency Food and Shel-
ter Program and then again in 1987 through the Stewart McKinney Homeless Assis-
tance Act. The latter has since been expanded beyond emergency shelter services
into such areas as transitional housing, but both programs represent attempts by
Congress to mitigate the effects of housing policy decisions it ratified just a few
years earlier. Our elected officials found themselves in the embarrassing position of
causing homelessness and trying to alleviate it at the same time. Their attempts to
relieve the crisis not only skirted the real source of the problem, but the amounts
appropriated for both programs were dwarfed by the large chunks taken away from
housing and other human needs programs.
The citizen movement to end homelessness gained momentum through the
1980s as more and more people became aware of the vast and growing number and
startling diversity of people without homes. As state authorities gradually began to
accept responsibility for providing emergency shelter to keep people off the streets,
advocates in larger numbers shifted their focus to some of the problem's causes—
most notably, affordable housing. The national affordable housing movement—
and public concern for the homeless in general— reached its peak strength in 1989,
which helped to cause a turnaround in Washington's housing policy. The National
Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) of 1990 was clearly a product of public pressure.
The day before a mass demonstration in Washington on October 7, 1989, members
of the House leadership met with homeless advocates and promised to push through
legislation that was reduced over the following year to NAHA. President Bush thus
had little choice but to pay some attention to the scandal-ridden Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The scandals were embarrassing and
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Bush's appointment of Jack Kemp to head the department, reestablish its credibility,
and make something of it again, translated into a fresh start for housing policy.
The Bush administration, however, attempted to drag its feet, in spite of enor-
mous public pressure, on the grounds that cleaning up HUD was all it could do for
a while. This was not the time for new programs or re-funding old ones. Moreover,
the "new direction" in housing favored by the administration emphasized the con-
version of public housing tenants into owners rather than confronting the immedi-
ate crisis of homelessness and the acute shortage of affordable housing. In the
meantime, the president answered critics by backing full funding of the McKinney
Act. Although Bush's support for both homeownership and the McKinney pro-
gram represent an improvement over the Reagan administration's refusal to
address the housing problem, it also signifies that his own administration has
not recognized in a substantive way the catastrophic effects of Reagan's failed
housing policy.
Because it felt the heat of public concern a little more closely, Congress moved
to revitalize the nation's housing policy. Though far from the comprehensive five-
year legislative package supported by advocates, NAHA represented a small first
step in reviewing the federal government's role in housing. The act incorporates
the administration's Homeownership Opportunity for People Everywhere
(HOPE) program and other homeownership initiatives, enhances state and local
spending authority and flexibility, sets aside funding for community housing devel-
opers to build capacity, and maintains or consolidates pre-existing housing pro-
grams such as new public housing construction. NAHA also includes measures
designed to prevent the loss of subsidized housing due to expiring contracts and
conversions. Owners are offered financial incentives to maintain the current use of
their units with a right of first refusal given to any qualified buyer willing to main-
tain the existing use, should the owner reject the incentives offered. This solution
is costly and fails to prevent all conversions, but at least it reflects a willingness to
deal with the problem.
The spending authority attached to NAHA for fiscal years 1991 and 1992 consti-
tutes a significant increase, but just as the act was passed in the wake of mounting
public activism, Washington's subsequent refusal to match the authorized amounts
with actual appropriations evidently reflects what appears to be a diminishing public
concern for the homeless. When the president and Congress allocated a mere $1.3
billion in additional funds for existing housing programs in NAHA's first year (fiscal
1991), offering no money for any of the act's new programs, congressional leaders
promised substantially higher appropriations for fiscal 1992. But this promise has
not been fulfilled. Although the new NAMA, HOME, and HOPE programs
received funding, the total appropriation in 1992 dropped from $9.3 to $8.8 billion.
Not only is compassion and activism waning, but a conservative backlash of public
hostility and intolerance has surfaced in many quarters. Follow-through on NAHA
has been frustrated by Bush's insistence on funding homeownership instead of
increasing the supply of low-cost housing and Congress's precarious commitment to
housing as a priority. As one indicator of this declining commitment, Congress voted
in the spring of 1991 to transfer $250 million from an existing public housing pro-
gram to the controversial space station project.
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Underlying Policy Principles
Perhaps the solutions to homelessness offered by the federal government and many
of the states thus far can be categorized as "too little too late" followed by "unkept
promises." If government intervention has yet to fulfill its share in tackling the prob-
lem, it has mitigated its effects by sheltering many people and housing a few more.
But underlying public policy with respect to homelessness in this country are at least
three working principles that require illumination and change. The first, best known
as the trickle-down theory, that is, that accumulated wealth eventually trickles down
from the few to the many, is a conscious principle of public policy. The second, tied
closely to this theory, involves subsidizing private for-profit ventures to provide
housing. The third principle involves waiting to address a social problem until its
meanest symptoms become intolerable and then treating only those symptoms,
which is a bad public policy habit.
To the extent that the trickle-down theory was ever real in the United States,
wealth and benefits have not trickled down in the current situation affecting home-
lessness. While it is true that homelessness has historically increased during reces-
sions and depressions in the economy and then abated, the increase in poverty
over the past decade has basically defied traditional boom-and-bust cycles and
therefore represents a changing dynamic. For example, our nation's current home-
less epidemic has steadily ballooned through two recessions and two periods of
economic prosperity.
Focusing on the most recent years, it was the conviction of both conservatives,
like Bush and Reagan, and many liberals that at least most of the poor and home-
less would somehow be taken care of as prosperity and economic expansion contin-
ued to serve the better-off. Consequently, as a matter of policy, elected officials in
Rhode Island chose to reap the harvest of good economic times by investing public
money (from all three levels) in upscale development projects rather than in low-
cost housing and other urgent community needs. For example, to attract business
and improve the appearance of downtown Providence, officials went for a $25 mil-
lion project to move the river flowing through the city and create an office park.
This project is half completed and the city is about to dig ground for a convention
center project, also in the downtown area, having relocated the bus terminal to an
inconvenient spot on the edge of town to make way. Now that the state and city are
reeling from record budget deficits and a recession is upon us, these projects have
lost some of their glamour and may not be completed. And it is unlikely that they
will have a measurable impact on the homeless problem.
The recent boom-and-bust cycle has been particularly nefarious because rather
than causing trickle-down effects, the good times seemed to drain resources from
the poor, creating more poverty and homelessness. Much of the investment of the
1980s, typified by junk bond trading, was phony rather than genuinely productive,
satisfying personal greed through consumption rather than human needs through
the creation of jobs and housing. Trickle-down assumptions, made by government
officials as a matter of ritual, were not applicable.
The second principle, subsidizing for-profit enterprises to provide housing, is a
more aggressive application of the trickle-down theory. While the more conservative
trickle-down policy approach depends on free-market forces to take care of social
needs, the more responsive version prefers to feed private industry and investors
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with public funds to facilitate the downward flow of benefits. This mode has been
the predominant vehicle employed by government in housing people in recent
decades. Many people, including many poor people, have been housed through this
method over the years, but as a principle of public policy, it is only marginally more
enlightened than the free-market approach and equally unjust.
There are many ways in which private profit is subsidized by the government to
produce more housing or facilitate homeownership. But when all the housing sub-
sidy dollars are added up, from all government programs and provisions, it should
alarm the average person to find that our nation's wealthy are subsidized to a much
greater degree than are poor people. A major example of this inequity is the archaic
policy of allowing all homeowners to deduct property taxes and mortgage interest
from their federal returns. These deductions, first provided during the Civil War,
have succeeded in facilitating homeownership, but radically changed economic con-
ditions since World War II (particularly inflation) have transformed this benefit into
a windfall monster. By 1990, the federal treasury was losing an astonishing $50 bil-
lion a year to homeowners, about five times the amount allocated to HUD for low-
income housing; one third of this amount went to taxpayers with incomes exceeding
$100,000. While over 75 percent of Americans earning over $100,000 receive federal
housing assistance, only 20 percent of low-income households in the country receive
housing aid of any kind, the lowest percentage of all industrial nations. 25 Although
it retains social value for a limited purpose, the homeowner deduction can thus be
seen as another contributing cause, albeit indirect, of homelessness. It has drained
resources from the poor to the rich (particularly during the 1980s), encouraged
homeownership at the expense of rental housing production, and contributed to dis-
location and escalating housing costs as buildings are quickly traded or converted
from affordable to upscale residences.
Public housing policy has also relied very heavily on private for-profit developers
and mortgage credit sources to produce and maintain subsidized housing for low-
income people. This widely accepted practice is defended on the ground that every-
one benefits. But in weighing the relative benefits that accrue to private business
and well-off individuals compared to the low-income tenant, one finds it difficult to
see how poor people are the policy's intended beneficiaries. Not only does the pro-
cess pay out an inordinate portion of public funds (officially intended to house low-
income people), to private for-profit organizations, but reliance on profit-oriented
players leads to the kind of costly bind we are now in with expiring contracts. In
passing the National Affordable Housing Act, Washington found no way out of this
bind other than to offer costly incentives to keep the housing affordable.
The third principle that animates much of how government responds to social
crises is the tendency to respond too late and the failure to confront causes. Long-
term urban renewal projects, like the Providence river relocation project, may
appear to reflect long-range thinking, and when these projects are touted for the
jobs they will produce and other trickle-down benefits they will create in the com-
munity, they appear to be addressing urban problems at their source. To a degree,
the projects do benefit people in need by providing short-term job opportunities, but
meeting the basic needs of poor people becomes a by-product of secondary, almost
incidental, significance in a planning process that serves primarily wealthy investors
and the mayors and governors.
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More to the point is how government has refused to acknowledge the real
causes of homelessness— when it concedes there is a problem at all. Typically, the
response is short term, but the temporary becomes permanent, thus perpetuating
the cycle in need of fundamental remedial action. Temporary emergency shelters
seem to be opened as if a hurricane just blew through town and everything will be
back to normal in a short while. More drug and alcohol detoxification beds are
added to existing wards to handle the rising demand caused by homelessness. In
Rhode Island, the largest state housing project in the past three years has been at
the state prison, where overcrowding has forced the courts to levy fines against the
state. One would think that a homeless person is more likely to commit a crime and
take up expensive prison space than a person living in a stable, affordable home.
The same is true for substance abuse. Yet at all levels of government, officials
launch crusades against crime and drugs that typically rely on the courts and pris-
ons, overlooking such obvious systemic factors as unemployment and the shortage
of affordable housing. This pernicious public policy habit not only fails to address
causes and thereby fails to solve chronic social problems, but it costs taxpayers a lot
more money in the long run. Decent, low-cost housing is expensive, but not when
compared to prisons.
Ending the Crisis: New Directions
There is a multitude of untried and underutilized remedies for the homeless crisis—
many of which are creative, potentially effective, or proven— to support the con-
clusion that ending homelessness is a matter of political will. The recent backlash
against the homeless themselves, which has led to repressive local ordinances
against loitering and panhandling (even sleeping!), reflects not only intolerance, but
also a frustration that we have not yet solved the problem or that the problem is
hopelessly intractable. Clearly, the collective "we" have not adequately resolved the
crisis, giving rise to a well-grounded frustration, but the elimination of homelessness
is within our reach if we are willing to change our collective priorities. I am con-
vinced, therefore, that the challenge of eliminating homelessness is primarily one of
generating enough political will. Indeed, the way is open and the choices are many.
The foregoing analysis suggests that many policy changes are needed, but overall,
attention needs to be paid to three broad and overlapping categories: housing, sup-
port services, and unemployment and poverty. To end homelessness, the public must
see to it that a sufficient amount of decent, stable, affordable housing is made avail-
able, that adequate support services are provided for homeless persons while they
are homeless, in transition, and in permanent housing, and that poverty and unem-
ployment are eliminated.
Housing the Homeless
Therefore, in my view, a new federal housing policy that intends to eliminate
homelessness must include these components.
1. Housing should be regarded as a right, much as it is in many industrialized and
developing countries throughout the world. Housing programs should be entitle-
ment programs.
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2. This means a substantial increase in public funds, particularly at the federal
level. An indication of the minimum commitment required is reflected in the Mickey
Leland Housing bill introduced, but not passed, in 1990. This measure authorized an
expenditure of $125 billion over a five-year period. The principal source of new
housing funds would likely be the military; such a transfer of funds would also yield
more employment if weapons programs were targeted for cuts. 26 The savings and
loan and bank bailout programs should also increase affordable housing by selling
off residential assets to housing nonprofits at discounted rates. Finally, billions could
be devoted to low-cost housing if homeowner tax deductions are curtailed.
3. The for-profit sector, as it participates in housing production at all levels
(credit, development, management, ownership, and so on) should be more tightly
regulated to increase the availability of affordable housing.
4. Beyond these regulatory measures, which have immediate application, the most
important long-term goal should be the transfer of ownership and control over low-
income housing from the private for-profit sector to the communities in which the
housing is located (social control). For example, a community may be represented
by a nonprofit land trust or housing developer, a limited equity cooperative, or the
state or local government. Social ownership and control can take many forms and
does not necessarily mean government ownership and control. Two promising vehi-
cles that have become increasingly available to apply social control at the local level
and outside of government are nonprofit housing groups and community land trusts.
Both are private, operate on the energy of people in the community who want to see
land and housing used for the common good, are monitored by government regula-
tions, and earn no profit. First, it will permit a more efficient use of public funds
intended for those in need by minimizing the cost of private profit in the housing
production and management process. Second, social control will stabilize housing
for those who are currently vulnerable to landlord action and displacement that
appears arbitrary. Third, social control will allow for continuous affordability
because affordability rather than market opportunity is the prime criterion for trans-
ferring ownership on use of housing units. Fourth, it represents a clear alternative to
the principle of might— or wealth— makes right in determining the distribution of
such necessities as housing.
5. Developing and managing subsidized housing should be decentralized. Cre-
ative, local housing solutions, including multisector partnerships, land trusts, and
cooperatives, have emerged as coping devices during this period of scarce federal
funding. This approach should be continued and encouraged. Federal funding can
most effectively take the form of direct one-time grants that pay for property acqui-
sition and construction/rehabilitation, permitting nonprofit developers to operate
debt free and apply rents to maintenance expenses alone.
6. Fair housing is as important as more housing in combating racism, poverty, and
homelessness. Low-income people, especially minorities, do not enjoy the freedom
either to remain where they are living or to move where they want to move to the
extent other people do. Nationwide investigations continue to reveal that African-
Americans and Hispanics seeking to rent or purchase homes in predominantly white
neighborhoods are subject to discriminatory treatment about 50 percent of the time.
Fair housing requires strict enforcement and strengthening of the Fair Housing Act
of 1968 and other existing legislation and that each community— and city neighbor-
hood— share in the provision of affordable housing and support programs.
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More Than a Home: Support Services
If this country were to reach the goal of providing every person in need with a safe,
decent, stable, and affordable home, it would be a great achievement. But this would
not in and of itself end homelessness; it would only substantially reduce it. Illnesses
such as schizophrenia, drug addiction, and pathological violence, or simple deficien-
cies in education and health care still make it difficult or impossible for some to
keep their housing. Moreover, because homelessness has a damaging effect on a
person, and on family units, support services are essential for people who have
become homeless if they are to keep their housing. The longer they are left on the
street and in shelters, and the more people who become homeless, the more support
services will be needed to repair the damage.
In considering what services to offer and how to offer them, policymakers should
apply these two principles: because homelessness is basically a housing issue, ser-
vices should be provided in conjunction with housing, and services, publicly and
privately offered, should be vigilantly coordinated, probably by state or city human
service departments, to minimize duplication and assure continuity of care.
Adequately serving the needs of the severely mentally ill is a major challenge. Past
mistakes, almost universally acknowledged, still need to be corrected. We need more
residential care homes— group homes that provide close personal and medical
supervision and care, homes that provide lay supervision in conjunction with CMHC
outpatient services. We also need more opportunities for visiting care available for
those stable enough to live in independent housing. Although most of the homeless
mentally ill can be cared for by these arrangements, more flexibility is needed to
hospitalize involuntarily those who are very sick and not meeting their survival
needs in the community.
Drug and alcohol abuse are equally challenging problems. The "war on drugs"
must be urgently redirected toward education, treatment, and the cessation of
imported drugs. Particularly, additional beds are needed for residential detoxifica-
tion, treatment, and halfway support.
Finally, we need to provide a wide array of services tied to housing projects in
addition to mental health and substance-abuse treatment. These services might
include family counseling, group and individual therapy addressing domestic vio-
lence, job counseling, day care, nutrition, health and home skills education, and case
management. Many of these services should be available on site, especially in larger
housing projects and developments.
Homelessness seems like an intractable problem, leading many to conclude that it
has become a permanent feature of our society. If homelessness poses a major chal-
lenge to public policymakers, which it does, it will be a bit easier to handle, at least
at the superficial level of getting everyone into a house, than will the older and
larger problem of poverty that feeds homelessness. In turn, poverty is both a cause
and effect of alienation and marginalization, which are deep seated and have histori-
cal roots. The articulation of a new public policy must incorporate an understanding
of this to effectively address the root causes of homelessness.
The process of forging this policy has begun spontaneously at the grassroots level.
Progress is made whenever a tenant group buys or acquires management control
over their development or when a housing nonprofit acquires a city parcel with a
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house, places the parcel under a land trust, and converts the house to a limited-
equity cooperative. These are probably the most real and hopeful signs of positive
change. Yet public policy change requires a broader-based movement at the local
and national levels. Elected officials are often the last to adopt the kinds of propos-
als outlined here. Moreover, until there is new leadership in Washington, any
progress will be slow and frustrating.
A movement for change requires the education and political mobilization of ordi-
nary people to generate the political will needed to affect policy. While the growing
diversity of the homeless population has inspired many to respond compassionately
and participate in public demonstrations for housing, advocates must educate these
supporters to go beyond the myth of the deserving poor. This attitude, fed by the
media, sets up a class system among the poor and homeless that ignores the
common roots of all poverty and homelessness.
As pressure for change trickles up to policymakers in Washington, what is called
for here is clearly something on the scale of a Marshall Plan, a scale of change that
will inevitably cost a degree of disruption for many. As it stands, I fear we can count
on a measure of upheaval ahead of us if we choose to stay the current policy course.
Even without upheaval, the status quo policy has proved to be a failure, with mass
homelessness, crime and violence, poverty, and drug abuse providing some of the
most conspicuous evidence. It is not working, and a fundamental departure is
urgently needed. ?*>
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